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Abstract 
Purpose: The present research aimed to investigate the effects of attribution on expert clinical 
judgment in comparison to semi-experts and lay-people.  Two research questions were 
addressed.  Firstly, would experts be less subject to attributional manipulations, in terms of their 
perceived ratings of dangerousness, than would semi-experts or lay-people?  Second, would 
experts be less subject to attributional manipulations, in terms of their assessments of offender 
responsibility, than would semi-experts or lay-people?   
 
Method: A 3x3x2 mixed groups design was implemented.  Participants read nine crime scenarios 
that had been internally or externally manipulated.  For each scenario, participants were asked to 
rate offender dangerousness, offender responsibility and the seriousness of the crime and to 
suggest a suitable sentence length.  Targeted recruitment was employed, yielding 12 experts, 21 
semi-experts and 22 lay-people.  
 
Results: Offenders were considered to be more responsible for their actions and more dangerous 
to others in the internal manipulations than in the external ones across all crime types and by all 
levels of expertise.  Findings indicate that semi-experts are less subject to the influence of 
attributional manipulations than both experts and lay-people.  Marked similarities in the pattern 
of expert and lay-person judgments can be observed from the present analyses. 
 
Conclusions: The current findings lend support to previous research in the area in that 
similarities between expert and lay-person judgment were observed.  However, through 
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expanding and clarifying the levels of expertise investigated, the current findings highlight the 
need for greater research into the distinct ‘semi-expert’ group. 
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Influencing Expert Judgment: Attributions of Crime Causality 
 
Introduction 
Violence risk assessment is a task of critical importance to psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, 
legislators, social workers and various others concerned with the accurate assessment and 
management of violent behaviour. The clinical approach to violence risk assessment, which 
relies entirely on human judgment, is the most commonly used method in practice (Cooke, 
Michie & Ryan, 2001; De Vogel & De Ruiter, 2004).  Despite its real-world prevalence, 
considerable academic scepticism has been expressed in relation to this approach (e.g., Monahan, 
1984; Quinsey, Harris, Rice & Cormier, 1998), with Monahan (1984) claiming that two out of 
three predictions of long term violence made by clinicians are incorrect. While this claim is 
frequently cited as evidence that clinical judgment is poor, Litwack (2001) suggested that there is 
little empirical support for the statement, and that there has been a rush to negatively judge 
clinicians’ capabilities in this context without a fair review of the clinical enterprise.  In fact, 
various studies have found clinicians to perform significantly above chance (e.g., Bonta, Law & 
Hanson, 1998; Gardner, Lidz, Mulvey, & Shaw, 1996; McMillan, Hastings & Coldwell, 2004). 
 
Other factors contributing to the perceived inadequacy of clinical judgment include claims that it 
is inferior to lay assessments (e.g., Quinsey et al., 1998). However, most studies cited as 
evidence that clinical judgments are no more accurate than those of lay persons are not only very 
old but tend to concern judgments other than violence risk assessments (e.g., Goldberg, 1959; 
Chapman & Chapman, 1967).  
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One study that did concern violence risk assessment was conducted by Quinsey and Cyr (1986). 
This study investigated the possibility of clinical judgment being subject to attribution error in a 
manner similar to that of lay-people. Specifically, the authors hypothesised that, in relation to 
crime scenarios, an internal attribution condition would be more associated with higher ratings of 
dangerousness and offender responsibility than would an external condition.  As expected, little 
difference between a group of clinicians and a group of lay-people in their ratings of 
dangerousness and perceived responsibility was found; and these findings were proposed as 
further evidence that clinicians have no special expertise in this violence risk assessment context.  
However, this claim is dubious owing to potential problems with the sample used in the study.  
For instance, of the 24 clinicians who took part in this study, only 16 had previous clinical 
experience with offenders. Furthermore, in relation to the 16 subjects with offender experience, 
the authors did not state the precise nature of or length of time of this experience. In addition, the 
sample contained 3 psychiatrists and 21 psychologists but only 14 of the latter possessed 
doctorates. Therefore, the findings may have been confounded by a lack of real expertise on the 
part of the clinicians and, perhaps, some of the expert sample might have been more fairly 
described as semi-experts. Without these potential sampling limitations, might the clinicians 
have demonstrated specific evidence of their expertise? To shed light upon this issue, it may be 
useful to draw on some of the literature that has focused on the quality of judgment in different 
domains of expertise.   
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Indeed, any examination of expert judgment should consider the concept of expertise itself 
(Thomson, Onkal, Avcioglu, & Goodwin, 2004).  Generally, experts are considered to have 
particular qualities that permit them to outperform non-experts on relevant tasks. We depend 
upon experts to influence and shape important policies that affect our lives; and in the context of 
violence risk assessment this reliance is of paramount importance.  Nevertheless, as discussed by 
Rowe and Wright (2001, p.342), “…it may be that the title of “expert” is conferred on those who 
hold particular roles rather than the basis of the known accuracy of their judgments.”  Clearly, 
for the label of “expert” to be justified, it is vital that those who possess it can outperform those 
who do not on a relevant task.  Unfortunately, it is not always practically possible to assess the 
quality of performance objectively.  
 
According to Bolger and Wright (1994), practitioners are likely to perform well when both 
ecological validity (i.e., when the task is relevant to the expertise of the subjects) and learnability 
(i.e., when adequate and usable feedback is available in the domain under examination) are high. 
But if either one of these constructs is low, performance is predicted to be poor. It would 
therefore be foolish to anticipate performance differences between practitioners and those with 
no experience in the task domain when both of the constructs are low (Bolger & Wright, 1994). 
 
In order to generate ecological validity, the experimental task must closely resemble the actual 
one executed by professionals in the workplace. It is possible for an experimenter, therefore, to 
establish high ecological validity via careful design of the study.  Bolger and Wright (1994) 
suggested, however, that the level of the second construct, learnability, is dependent on the type 
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of performance feedback that is available in the domain under consideration. These authors 
found that expert performance is typically good in domains where rapid and unambiguous 
feedback is available (e.g., horse racing) but is often poor in domains where such feedback is 
lacking (e.g., stock price forecasting and indeed risk assessment, where there are rarely 
mechanisms in place to allow this). This would imply that in some domains it is practically 
impossible for practitioners to perform well. 
 
However, Thomson et al. (2004) have argued that in instances of rare events that occur at 
irregular intervals (such as someone committing murder after being released from a mental 
institution), learnability can be facilitated in other ways. The authors argued that experts can 
learn from detailed investigations of such events and the publication of the results of these 
investigations. In this manner the causes of events will be fed back to the population of experts, 
who, in turn, are likely to increase their levels of expertise over time with the experience of more 
investigations.          
 
It is known that expert and novice reasoning strategies differ from one another (Shanteau, 1988). 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) proposed a five-stage model of developing expertise, which outlined 
the levels of expertise: novice, advanced beginner, competent, proficient, and expert.  At the 
novice stage the individual does not use intuitive judgment, but instead adheres to taught rules.  
The advanced beginner, on the other hand, uses rules involving both situational and taught 
context-free ones.  Their situational perception is, however, limited at this stage.  In addition, 
attributes and aspects of a situation are considered separately and are equally weighted.  The 
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competent individual is able to recognize many context-free and situational aspects, but is likely 
to become overwhelmed.  As such, the individual uses standardized, hierarchical planning to 
overcome the task.  In doing so, however, only a limited amount of information is considered at 
any one time.  The proficient individual no longer sees aspects, but can consider the situation as 
a whole and identify its most important features.  While intuitive decision making is used for the 
majority of the time, a return to deliberative, analytical thinking occurs when particular aspects 
become apparent as particularly important to a situation.  At the final stage, the expert no longer 
relies on rules or guidelines, but instead performs intuitively based on experience and deep 
understanding.  Analytic thinking only returns when a novel situation or problem arises.  This 
framework has been explicitly applied clinical judgment within the nursing discipline (Benner, 
2004), and less explicit examples can be found within the psychodiagnostic literature.  For 
example, Witteman and van den Bercken (2007) investigated psychodiagnostic accuracy across 
three levels of expertise: novices, intermediates (akin to the competent stage) and experts.  The 
researchers found the intermediate group to be distinct from both the experts and novices in their 
sample, performing both faster and poorer in the task, and labeled this the intermediate effect.  In 
addition, Groenier, Pieters, Hulshof, Wilhelm, and Witteman (2008) found that deviations from 
theoretical psychodiagnostic models were related to clinical experience, and suggested that this 
change in reasoning strategy is brought about in order to cope with the increasing pressures of 
time associated with increasing clinical experience (and consequently, increasing role pressure), 
with clinicians approaching cases in a more flexible manner as experience increases as compared 
to novices. 
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In line with Witteman and van den Bercken’s (2007) group selections, the present research 
directly compared the responses of experts, semi-experts and lay-people to crime scenarios with 
internal and external conditions. To avoid the potential sampling problems discussed above, 
careful attention was given to the allocation of participants to particular categories of expertise, 
as detailed later.   The present study also attempted to ensure ecological validity by basing the 
scenarios on actual cases and by having two independent clinicians judge their contents in terms 
of the type of information practitioners typically receive to formulate their assessments. 
 
As there is little agreement within the literature to support or deny the accuracy of clinician 
judgment in violence risk assessment, predictions of experimental outcome were deemed 
unsuitable and therefore the following research questions were formulated based on the findings 
of Quinsey and Cyr (1986): 
 
1) Would experts be less subject to attributional manipulations, in terms of their ratings of 
dangerousness, than would semi-experts or lay-people? 
2) Would experts be less subject to attributional manipulations, in terms of their assessments 
of offender responsibility, than would semi-experts or lay-people?  
 
The present study also aimed to examine an interesting notion put forward by Quinsey and Cyr 
(1986) that a relationship between levels of incarceration and the internal attribution of violent 
behaviour may exist.  These authors suggested that internal attribution may be positively related 
to incarceration: individuals whose behaviour is considered to be internal are generally viewed as 
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being responsible for their actions and are, therefore, held as morally accountable for their 
actions (Schultz & Wright, 1985).  Quinsey and Cyr (1986) further asserted that offenders who 
are seen as responsible for their actions would be incarcerated in accordance with the legal 
system.  Given these suggestions, the present research further aimed to investigate whether or not 
a relationship would exist between the attributional information and recommendations of 
sentence length.  In addition to the above research questions, the current research aimed to 
explore the possible effects of internally and externally manipulated information on a number of 
additional factors across and between the three levels of expertise, including the effects of the 
attributional manipulations on judgments of seriousness of crime, the likelihood that the offender 
would benefit from psychological help, whether the offender was likely to re-offend, whether a 
full risk assessment was necessary, and the suitability of particular types of treatment. 
 
 
Methodology 
Design 
A 3x3x2 mixed groups design was employed, with the variables: expertise (experts, semi-
experts, lay-people), crime type (murder, assault, armed robbery) and scenario manipulation 
(internal and external attribution).  The independent variables were the participants’ level of 
clinical expertise and the internal/external scenario manipulations.  The dependent variable was 
the participants’ responses on the questionnaires given.  Post-hoc power analysis for the 
ANOVAs used in the analyses (using G*Power 3; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007) 
measuring for large effect size (0.4, following Cohen’s conventions), with α set at 0.05 
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(following the norm) indicated 1-β to be 0.73.  Post-hoc power analyses that were conducted for 
the chi-square investigations, measuring for large effect size (0.5, following Cohen’s 
conventions), with α set at 0.05 (following the norm) indicated 1- β to be 0.86.  It was therefore 
concluded that the study was adequately powered. 
 
Participants 
55 individuals participated in the study. The lay-person group consisted of 22 individuals (7M; 
15F) aged 18-62 years (mean 33.5).  The mean time spent in education within this group was 
15.3 years.  None of the participants within this group had received any training in psychiatry or 
psychology, or were involved in legal practice, correctional or health related occupations. 
 
The semi-expert group consisted of 21 individuals (3M; 18F) aged 21-48 years (mean 28.4).  
Eleven were undertaking a Masters level degree in forensic psychology, eight were working as 
trainee psychologists and eight were working as assistant psychologists.  The mean time spent in 
education within this group was 17.7 years.  Twenty of these participants were currently 
involved in correctional or health related occupations.  None of these participants were involved 
in legal practice but all had basic experience of violence risk assessment.  The participants in this 
group had some, though relatively limited, experience in conducting violence risk assessments. 
 
The expert group consisted of 12 individuals (5M; 7F) aged 28-61 years (mean 41.8), eight of 
whom were clinical/forensic psychologists, two were psychiatrists and two were forensic 
practitioners - the latter two participants had extensive practical experience in the process of 
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conducting violence risk assessment in practice, despite not having a doctorate qualification.  All 
participants within this group had at least five years of clinical experience and were highly 
familiar with the task of conducting violence risk assessments.  The mean time spent in 
education within this group was 20.2 years. 
 
Apparatus 
Nine one-page crime scenarios were developed based on actual case notes and interviews and 
were supplemented with information on specific offender characteristics (see Grant, Won Kim & 
Brown, 2001; Normandeau, 1972; Quinsey & Cyr, 1986).  An internal and external manipulation 
of each of the scenarios was created.  Based on Quinsey and Cyr (1986), three specific types of 
violent crimes were chosen for use in the present study: murder, assault and armed robbery.  
Previous acts within the internal manipulations were designed to be similar to those described in 
the external ones in order to maintain consistency between the internal and external versions of 
scenarios.  Scenarios were assigned to participants using a random number generator program 
(Haahr, 2008).  Participants received one version of each scenario, either the external or internal 
version.  Each scenario began with a descriptive paragraph of the stimulus individual’s pre-
offense history and background.  Typically included were: previous offences, work-related 
history, family history, economic background, current relationship status, age and gender.  All 
stimulus individuals were male.  For each crime type, a scenario was written involving stimulus 
individuals aged 18, 30 and 52 years.  This section was followed by one detailing the current 
crime and outcome to the victim.  In accordance with Quinsey and Cyr (1986), participants were 
asked to give their recommendations on the type of treatment that would be most appropriate for 
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each scenario, whether they felt the offender should be incarcerated and for how long, whether 
they believed the offender would re-offend and also for their opinion on whether or not a full risk 
assessment on the target individual was necessary.  This final question acted to disguise the 
decision making and judgment focus of the present investigation from participants, therefore 
preventing responses from being biased to what ‘should be said’.  As such, this variable is not 
included in the analyses.  In addition, five five-point rating scales were given that measured 
seriousness of crime, dangerousness to others and to self, the probability that the offender would 
benefit from psychological/psychiatric help and the offenders’ level of responsibility for the 
crime. 
 
McAuley, Duncan and Russell’s (1992) Revised Causal Dimension Scale (CDSII) was employed 
after each scenario and questionnaire in order to assess the effectiveness of the attributional 
manipulations.  The items within the CDSII yield four causal dimensions: locus of causality, 
external control, stability and personal control.    
 
Procedure 
Participants were given a pack consisting of an information sheet, consent form, participant 
instructions, nine crime scenarios and nine corresponding questionnaires.  These questionnaires 
were placed after each crime scenario and the contents of the questionnaires remained constant 
for each scenario.  Participants were asked within the instructions to treat scenarios as individual 
cases, and answer the corresponding questionnaire before moving onto the next scenario.    
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Results 
The effectiveness of the attributional manipulations were analysed by means of a 3x2 unrelated 
analysis of variance for each of the CDSII dimensions, with the independent variables of 
expertise and scenario manipulation.  Significant differences between the internal and external 
manipulations were demonstrated across all four dimensions, indicating successful scenario 
manipulation.  As expected following the logical internal-external design of the scenarios, Locus 
of Control (F=118.46, df=1, 462, p<0.001), Stability (F=42.39, df=1,455, p<0.001) and Personal 
Control (F=9.23, df=1, 462, p=0.003) were rated higher in the internal scenario manipulations 
than in the external ones and External Control was rated higher in the external manipulations 
than in the internal ones (F=36.98, df=1,453, p<0.001).  These findings indicate that individuals 
depicted in the internally manipulated scenarios were considered to be more in control of their 
situation and more stable than those depicted in the external manipulations. 
 
In order to investigate Quinsey and Cyr’s (1986) assertion that a relationship between levels of 
incarceration and consequent sentencing and the internal attribution of violent behavior may 
exist, a bivariate crosstabulation using the chi-square statistic was carried out on participant 
responses to whether or not the target offenders should be incarcerated (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 about here 
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Table 1 clearly shows a relationship between the proportion of participants recommending 
incarceration and the attributional scenario manipulations.  From the column percentages, it can 
be ascertained that while the majority of participants chose to recommend incarceration for the 
offenders in both the internal and the external versions of the scenarios, fewer participants 
recommended incarceration in the external manipulations than in the internal ones.  The chi-
square analysis (χ2(1, N =485)=27.75, p<0.001) indicates that this relationship in the data is 
significant, thus supporting Quinsey and Cyr’s (1986) assertion that a relationship between levels 
of incarceration and the internal attribution of violent behavior may exist.  This analysis was 
followed by a 3x3x2 unrelated analysis of variance investigating the consequent sentence length 
recommendations measured across the internal/external attributional scenario manipulations, the 
three levels of expertise and the three crime types (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2 about here  
 
A significant main effect of crime type was present (F=21.80, df=2, 316, p<0.001).  As would be 
expected, higher sentence lengths were recommended for murder than for both assault and armed 
robbery (Table 2).  No significant main effects of expertise or scenario manipulation were 
present, nor were any interaction effects.  Thus, Quinsey and Cyr’s (1986) assertion that a 
relationship may exist between sentencing recommendations and the internal attribution of 
violent behaviour was not supported by the present findings. 
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In order to guard against Type 1 error, a multivariate analysis of variance using the Pillais Trace 
criteria was conducted, with two fixed factor independent variables (level of expertise and 
attributional scenario manipulation) and five dependant variables, including seriousness of crime, 
dangerousness of the offender to others and to self, the probability that the offender would 
benefit from psychological help, and the offenders level of responsibility for the crime, with the 
following significant finding: Pillias Trace=0.042, F(10, 920)=1.96, p=0.035.  Follow up 
multivariate comparisons found significant associations between level of expertise and 
seriousness of the offence (F=3.03, df=2, 463, p=0.049), dangerousness of the offender to others 
(F=3.20, df=2, 463, p=0.42),the probability that the offender would benefit from psychological 
help (F=6.40, df=2, 463, p=0.002) and the offenders level of responsibility for the crime (F=3.53, 
df=2, 463, p=0.03), and between the attributional manipulations and seriousness of the offence 
(F=7.64, df=1, 463, p=0.006),dangerousness of the offender to others (F=66.41, df=1, 463, 
p<0.001) and level of responsibility (F=30.93, df=1, 463, p<0.001).  To aid interpretation of 
these findings, the mean values and standard deviations for these five variables are shown in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Significant interactions between level of expertise and the attributional manipulations were 
found only in the ratings for offender dangerousness to others (F=4.13, df=2, 463, p=0.017) and 
offender responsibility (F=6.23, df=2, 463, p=0.002).  These significant interactions were 
investigated further by means of a 3x3x2 unrelated ANOVA, with the independent variables: 
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expertise, scenario manipulation and crime type.  In all cases the conditions of ANOVA were met 
(i.e., data were normally distributed and variances were homogenous).  As such, Tukey’s 
Honestly Significant Different tests were employed following the interactions reported below. 
 
A significant main effect of crime type was found in the ratings for both offender dangerousness 
to others and level of responsibility, with individuals committing armed robbery rated as more 
responsible for their actions than was the case in the assault and murder scenarios (F=12.79, 
df=2, 465, p<0.001), and being deemed to be more dangerous to others than those committing 
assault or murder (F=6.65, df=2, 470, p=0.001).   
 
A significant main effect of scenario manipulation was present in both dangerousness of the 
offender to others (F=85.85, df=1, 470, p<0.001) and offender level of responsibility (F=33.72, 
df=1, 465, p<0.001), with higher ratings given in the internal manipulations.  These findings 
indicate that individuals depicted within the internal manipulations were considered to be more 
responsible for their offence and of more danger to others than those depicted in the external 
manipulations. 
   
A significant main effect of expertise was present in the ratings of offender responsibility 
(F=4.75, df=2, 465, p=0.009)  Those participants in the expert and semi-expert groups rated 
offender responsibility at approximately equal levels, with lay-people providing the highest 
assertions of offender responsibility, as illustrated in Table 3. 
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Significant interactions were found to exist both in the judgments of offender responsibility and 
the extent to which the offender was judged as dangerous to others.  In the judgments relating to 
offender responsibility for the crime, a significant interaction between level of expertise and 
scenario manipulation was present (F=5.86, df=2, 465, p=0.003), indicating that the responses 
given by experts, semi-experts and lay-people were not equal across the internal/external 
scenario manipulations.  In addition, a significant interaction between crime type and the 
internal/external scenario manipulations was present (F=8.99, df=2, 465, p<0.001) indicating that 
the judgments made in relation to the three crime types differed across the internal/external 
scenario manipulations.  These interactions are illustrated in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Offenders were seen to be more responsible in the internal manipulations than the external across 
all crime types and by all levels of expertise.  However, this difference was most apparent in the 
murder scenarios.  Post hoc Tukey’s HSD comparisons indicate that the mean ratings of offender 
responsibility differed significantly between the internal (M=4.26, SD=0.083) and external 
(M=3.32, SD=1.21) attributional manipulations for the crime type murder only (p<0.001), with 
offenders being considered as more responsible for their crime in the internal manipulations.  In 
addition, it was found that in the external manipulations, the ratings of responsibility in the 
murder scenarios were significantly lower than in the case of both assault (M=3.92, SD=0.89; 
p=0.001) and armed robbery (M=4.32, SD=0.73; p<0.001).  Of particular interest is the 
interaction between the level of expertise and the scenario manipulations: while it can be seen 
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that both experts and lay-people rated the offender as more responsible in the internal scenario 
manipulations than in the external manipulations, with this difference being of approximately 
equal measure, the semi-experts presented only a very slight difference in judgments of offender 
responsibility across these manipulations. Tukey’s HSD comparisons revealed that in the internal 
manipulations, significant differences existed between the semi-experts (M=4.03, SD=1) and 
lay-people (M=4.57, SD=0.72) only, with lay-people considering the offender to be significantly 
more responsible for their crime than semi-experts (p=0.002).  Significant differences between 
the internal and external manipulations were present for both the expert participants (internal 
M=4.36, SD=0.69; external M=3.61, SD=1.08; p=0.002) and the lay-person participants (internal 
M=4.57, SD=0.72; external M=3.88, SD=1.1; p<0.001).  Significant differences between the 
ratings of responsibility were not found between the internal and external manipulations for the 
semi-expert participants. 
 
As with ratings of offender responsibility, significant interactions between level of expertise and 
scenario manipulation (F=3.49, df=2, 470, p=0.031), and between crime type and the 
internal/external scenario manipulations (F=11.09, df=2, 470, p<0.001) were present in the 
judgments of offender dangerousness to others, as shown in Figure 2.   
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Offenders were judged to be more dangerous to others in the internal manipulations than in the 
external, across all crime types and by all levels of expertise.  This difference was again most 
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apparent in the murder scenarios.  Tukey’s HSD comparisons revealed that in the case of the 
external manipulations, individuals depicted in the murder scenarios (M=2.17, SD=1.2) were 
considered to be less dangerous than those depicted in both the assault (M=3.11, SD=1.23; 
p<0.001) and the armed robbery scenarios (M=3.29, SD=1.26; p<0.001) scenarios.  In addition, 
significant differences in the ratings of dangerousness to others were found between the internal 
and external manipulations for all three crime types (p<0.05), with the individuals depicted in the 
internal versions of the assault (M=3.7, SD=1.05), armed robbery (M=3.8, SD=0.85), and 
murder (M=3.7, SD=1.05) scenarios being considered as more dangerous than those in the 
external versions.  As with the judgments of offender responsibility, it can once again be seen 
that both experts and lay-people rated the offender as more dangerous to others in the internal 
manipulations than in the external ones, to a similar degree.  Tukey’s HSD tests revealed 
significant differences between the internal and external manipulations for all three levels of 
expertise.  As before, the differences between the semi-expert’s judgments of dangerousness 
across the two scenario manipulations are much less than those of the other two groups, with 
Tukey’s HDSD comparisons revealing that semi-expert ratings of dangerousness (M=3.12, 
SD=1.23) were significantly higher than those of experts (M=2.51, SD=1.26) in the external 
manipulations only (p=0.032). 
 
In order to investigate the relationship between the internal and external attributional 
manipulations and the type of treatments recommended, while controlling for level of expertise, 
a multivariate crosstabulation using the chi-square statistic was carried out.  The findings are 
shown in Table 4.  A significant association between the treatment recommendation made and 
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the attributional manipulation was found only in the case of lay people (χ2(4, N =198)=18.09, 
p=0.001).  No significant associations were found between the treatment recommendations and 
attributional manipulations for semi-experts (χ2(4, N =186)=4.96, p=0.292) or experts χ2(4, N 
=80)=3.68, p=0.451).  Thus the strength of the association between treatment type 
recommendations and attributional manipulation is greatest in the lay-person group. 
 
Table 4 about here  
 
As shown in Table 4, a significant difference in the proportion of recommendations for 
psychotherapy and for CBT with medication between the internal and external attributional 
manipulations is present within the lay-person group.  In the case of psychotherapy, 
recommendations are almost double in the external manipulation than in the internal 
manipulation.  In the case of CBT with medication, 21.7% more lay-participants recommended 
this treatment in the internal manipulations than in the external.  No other significant differences 
between recommendations made in the internal and external manipulations were observed. 
 
A final multivariate crosstabulation using the chi-square statistic was carried out in order to 
investigate the relationship between the attributional manipulations and the participant’s 
predictions of re-offending behaviour, when controlling for level of expertise.  A significant 
association between predictions of re-offending behaviour and the attributional manipulations 
were found for experts (χ2(1, N =95)=16.08, p<0.001), semi-experts (χ2(1, N =189)=9.41, 
p<0.001) and lay-people (χ2(1, N =196)=34.58, p<0.001), indicating that a significant association 
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between predictions of re-offending behaviour and attributional manipulation exists, even after 
controlling for level of expertise. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
As shown in Table 5, participants across all three levels of expertise were more likely to predict 
re-offending behaviour in those individuals depicted in the internal scenario manipulations than 
in those depicted in the external manipulations.  When scrutinizing the chi-square statistic, it 
becomes apparent that the strength of this association is greatest in the lay-person group than for 
both the expert and semi-expert groups. 
 
 
Discussion 
The present study investigated the effects of internal and external manipulations of crime 
causality on clinical judgment across three levels of expertise. A clear and transparent criterion 
for inclusion in expert, semi-expert and lay-person categories was followed.  In adhering to 
specific and strict group categorization, the present research addressed the sampling issues of the 
Quinsey and Cyr (1986) study, as discussed earlier.  By introducing a semi-expert category, the 
present research has highlighted an interesting pattern of findings that indicate the distinctness in 
judgments made by semi-experts in comparison to experts and lay-people.   
 
This is a pre-publication final draft of the paper: Murray, J., Thomson, M. E., Cooke, D. J., & 
Charles, K. E. (2011).  Influencing expert judgment: Attributions of crime causality.  Legal and 
Criminological Psychology, 16(1), 126-143. 
Influencing Expert Judgment 
Page 23 
 
 
Of key concern in the current research was the effect of attributional manipulation on the 
judgments made by experts, semi-experts and lay-people.  The present research found that 
offenders were considered to be more dangerous to others and more responsible for their crime 
in the internally manipulated scenarios than in the externally manipulated ones across all levels 
of expertise.  However, smaller differences in judgments of dangerousness and level of 
responsibility between the internal/external manipulations were produced by the semi-expert 
group than was the case with the experts and lay-people; both experts and lay-people 
demonstrated similar patterns of judgment in assessing offender dangerousness and 
responsibility.  
 
These findings support those of Quinsey and Cyr (1986) in that they demonstrate marked 
similarities in expert and lay-person judgment.  Such similarities are not uncommon, with little 
or no differences being found between experts and lay-people/novices in numerous earlier 
studies (e.g., Levy & Ulman, 1967; Oskamp 1962; Meehl, 1959; Quinsey & Cyr, 1986; Waiters, 
White, & Green, 1988; Wiggins & Hoffman, 1968).  Ganzach (1997) argued that these 
expert/lay-person similarities were largely found due to ‘noisy parameters’, such as measures of 
accuracy and focusing on linear models that did not represent ‘true’ differences between experts 
and novices.  Indeed, Ganzach’s (1997) findings were in support of this theory, as when 
investigating the linear weighting of expert/novice MMPI scoring and when assessing accuracy, 
little differences between the two groups were found.  The researcher explained these similarities 
in terms of judgment strategies, suggesting that when the relationship between the criterion for a 
judgment and the cues on which it is based is weak, that the judgment strategies used would have 
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a weak impact on judgment accuracy.  However, with both the present research and that of 
Witteman and van den Bercken (2007) finding few differences between expert and lay 
judgments, but finding such a distinct difference in those of intermediates or semi-experts, one 
must question this explanation, and consider that it is the level of expertise honed and the 
decision making style that is important when considering differences in judgments across 
expertise. 
 
The most surprising result relates to the observation that the semi-expert group produced 
judgments distinctly less affected by the manipulated information. The question is: how can one 
account for this unexpected finding in terms of the existing expertise literature?  According to 
the concept of learnability (Bolger & Wright, 1994), expert judgment is likely to be poor and 
should not necessarily be expected to be better than that of lay-people when there is inadequate 
and infrequent feedback in domain of expertise.  Unless learnability is facilitated in other ways, 
such as through detailed investigations constantly being fed back to the expert population 
(Thomson et al., 2004), then expert judgment is likely to be poor. In the present study, the semi-
expert group, who were still in relevant education or had more recently been in education, were 
more likely to have had their judgment facilitated in this manner.  Conversely, even though they 
have more direct experience, clinicians working under pressure may lack the time and/or the 
motivation to continually and carefully read detailed reports of other clinicians’ cases, especially 
when such cases are not in their specific area of concern.  This possibility suggests that the 
running of  regular training sessions, designed to actively consider previous investigations and 
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the lessons that can be learned from these investigations, may be of more practical use to 
clinicians than, say, their attendance at academic conferences.  
 
The findings therefore highlight the importance of adhering to strict group classification when 
investigating the role of expertise in judgments of violence risk assessment, having uncovered a 
distinct level of expertise in terms of judgments made (i.e., the semi-expert group) in comparison 
to traditional expert/lay-person comparisons.  This finding may indeed hold important clues for 
improving expert judgment in violence risk assessment practice: by identifying what is distinct 
about the semi-expert group in comparison to experts and lay-people, it may be possible to 
decrease attribution error in expert judgment.  For example, Chen, Froehle and Morran (1997) 
found that trainee counselors who participated in training sessions designed to instruct in 
attribution processes they blamed the cause of presenting problems less on internal factors than 
those within a control condition.  These findings in conjunction with those of the present 
research indicate that ongoing training focusing on attributional awareness may be the key to de-
biasing judgments in violence risk assessment.    
 
Risk assessment, as previously discussed, is a notoriously difficult task (Doctor, 2004), with 
clinicians having to make judgments and decisions under pressures of time and workload and 
under conditions of relative uncertainty (Dixon & Oyebody, 2007).  The use of heuristics and 
causal attributions in judgment and decision making is an evolved system, designed to reduce 
cognitive load while minimizing error.  Thus, it must be noted that attribution is not necessarily a 
negative process in this context.  Indeed, it may be the case that the expert and lay person groups 
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are performing in a more effective way than the semi-experts, in that their assessments of 
offender characteristics are taking into account the internal and external differences.  That is, 
although the semi-expert group may appear less biased in their judgments, are these judgments 
actually poorer due to the possibility of missed cues relating to the internal versus external 
factors associated with the offender in the attributionally manipulated scenarios.  As discussed 
previously, individuals who are seen to be more in control of their behaviour are considered to be 
more responsible for their actions than, say someone whose behaviour was attributed to an 
external cause (Schultz & Wright, 1985).  Thus, an individual whose violent behaviour was 
deemed to be caused by an enduring internal trait will be considered as more morally responsible 
for their behaviour than had that individual acted violently in order to defend themselves.  It is 
this type of internal/external distinction in behavioural causality that is of the utmost importance 
when considering the implications and findings of attributional research.   
 
However, while the use of cognitive shortcuts usually produces adequate solutions to everyday 
problems, a number of errors can arise through their use, thus impeding judgment.  The present 
research highlights this issue: in presenting intentionally manipulated information, with static 
factors (e.g., gender, age, race) maintained across both the internal and external manipulations of 
each scenario, the researchers were able to elicit distinct differences in judgments of offender 
dangerousness and the offender’s level of responsibility for the crime.   
 
In discussing the internal versus external perceptions of behavioural cause, there are clear 
implications for the field of violence risk assessment.  In order for effective treatment planning 
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and risk management to occur, the causal factors driving the individual’s problem(s) must be 
identified. If these factors are identified as internal, or controllable, a different reaction to the 
individual may be evoked than if the factors were seen as external.  For example, Plous (1993) 
discussed the impact of attribution on the treatment recommendations made by psychotherapists, 
suggesting that where a clinician attributes the cause of behavior to be due to situational factors 
or to the individuals own disposition, treatment recommendations may differ.  Plous (1993) 
suggested that when a clinician ascribes situational (external) causality, that greater effort is 
made to alter an individual’s circumstances.  However, where an individual’s disposition 
(internal) is judged to be the cause of behaviour, greater effort is placed on altering aspects of the 
client.  This may, of course, be suited to the particular treatment/risk management plan being 
developed.  However, should internal/external causality be prematurely or incorrectly placed, 
this would have clear and perhaps serious implications for the individual.  While such 
attributional error is of clear concern, Murray and Thomson (2009) argued that attribution may 
be useful in a clinical context: should the clinician identify not only their client’s underlying 
causal attributions, but also the way in which they themselves attribute causality to their clients 
behavior, then the clinician will be better equipped to make an unbiased assessment and to 
identify more effective interventions for their client. 
 
While the current findings may suggest that experts are no different than lay-people in terms of 
judgments made relating to violence risk assessment, as has been the previous assertion in the 
literature, they may instead indicate that while experts in violence risk assessment may be 
making what would appear to be biased judgments, they may in fact be making assessments 
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based on dynamic risk factors (i.e., those factors affecting risk of violence that are changeable 
over time).  Recent research has indicated that these dynamic factors are just as important as the 
more classically considered static risk factors (Elbogen, Van Dorn, Swanson, Swartz & 
Monahan, 2006).  Thus, the current findings may be indicative of the different processes 
occurring in the different levels of expertise.  That is, the use of ‘untrained’ cognitive shortcuts at 
the lay person stage, the reduction in the reliance on heuristic decision making co-occurring with 
ongoing training at the semi-expert level, and the apparent return to the use of cognitive shortcuts 
in judgment at the expert level.  This return to the use of cognitive shortcuts may indeed only be 
‘apparent’, with the individual having honed such a level of intuitive expertise in the area to 
identify and weigh the risk of violence based on not only the more commonly identified static 
factors (as would perhaps be the main factors assessed at the semi-expert level), but also on the 
dynamic factors associated with risk of violence. 
 
As with the findings of Witteman and van den Bercken (2007), a clear difference particularly in 
the ‘intermediate’ semi-expert level of expertise can be ascertained from the current findings, 
lending some support for the intermediate effect being present. However, considering Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus’ (1986) framework of expertise, and taking into account the proposed alterations in 
judgment formations discussed above, it may be considered that the present findings present 
support for the Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ (1986) framework: i.e., the lay-person group in the present 
research may represent the ‘novice’ group proposed in the framework; the semi-expert group in 
the current research may represent the ‘competent’ level of expertise in the framework, having 
stopped using intuitive decision making and instead using a structured, hierarchical method of 
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assessment; and the expert group of the current research, as could be expected, represent the 
expert group in the framework. 
 
As discussed previously, Quinsey and Cyr (1986) proposed that a relationship would exist 
between levels of incarceration and the internal attribution of violent behaviour.  As could be 
expected, higher sentence lengths were recommended in scenarios depicting murder than in the 
armed robbery and assault scenarios.  No effects of attributional manipulation were present, nor 
were there differences across the three levels of expertise.  These findings do not support the 
notion put forth by Quinsey and Cyr (1986), and therefore no distinguishable relationship was 
established between internal versus external attributions of violent behaviour and length of 
incarceration based on the current data.  However, some support was provided in terms of 
recommendations for incarceration: significantly more participants recommended incarcerating 
those depicted in the internal scenarios than in the external ones. 
  
The current findings highlight the complexity of the decision making processes involved in 
violence risk assessment and lend some support to Quinsey and Cyr’s (1986) original findings 
relating to causal attributions in clinical judgment.  However, through expanding and clarifying 
the levels of expertise investigated, the current findings have highlighted an important and 
distinct difference in the effects of causal attributions on varying levels of expertise, in line with 
Witteman and van den Bercken’s (2007) findings.  These findings emphasize the need for greater 
research into not only expert and lay-person judgments, but also into the distinct semi-expert 
group, in order to further our understanding of violence risk assessment across the varying stages 
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of clinical expertise.  As it is unclear from the current and previous findings whether or not 
attribution effects on clinical judgment have a positive or negative influence, it is therefore 
recommended that more research specific to attribution effects in violence risk assessment be 
conducted prior to applying de-biasing techniques, such as those suggested by Chen et al. 
(1997), to violence risk assessment practice.  However, a tentative recommendation of training 
sessions promoting awareness of attributional influences on both the clinicians’ judgments and 
those of their clients would appear to be relevant based on the current findings and on the 
recommendations made in previous papers (e.g., Chen et al., 1997; Murray & Thomson, 2009). 
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Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Proportion of participant responses relating to whether or not the offender should be 
incarcerated, measured across attributional manipulation. 
 
Incarcerated 
Internal External 
N (%) N (%) 
Yes 198 (83.9) 156 (62.7) 
No 38 (16.1) 93 (37.3) 
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Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the main effect of crime type in relation to recommended 
sentence length. 
 
Crime Type 
Mean 
(years) 
SD 
Minimum 
(years) 
Maximum 
(years) 
N 
Assault 4.70 6.27 0.08 60 106 
Murder 10.28 8.27 0.30 60 115 
Armed Robbery 3.77 5.92 0.02 60 113 
Total 6.31 7.49 0.02 60 334 
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Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics relating to the effect of expertise on: seriousness, responsibility, 
dangerousness, and the belief that the offender would benefit from psychological help. 
 
Variable 
Level of 
Expertise 
Mean SD Minimum Maximum N 
Seriousness of 
Crime 
Expert 4.18 0.85 2 5 103 
Semi-Expert 4.08 0.81 2 5 189 
Lay-person 3.87 1.09 1 5 198 
Offender 
Responsibility 
Expert 4.00 0.97 1 5 96 
Semi-Expert 3.98 0.98 1 5 189 
Lay-person 4.22 1.00 1 5 198 
Benefit from 
Psychological 
Help 
Expert 3.39 1.09 1 5 102 
Semi-Expert 3.75 1.15 1 5 188 
Lay-person 3.89 1.28 1 5 198 
Offender 
Dangerousness 
to Self 
Expert 2.51 1.35 1 5 87 
Semi-Expert 2.51 1.08 1 5 189 
Lay-person 2.68 1.30 1 5 198 
Offender 
Dangerousness 
Expert 3.07 1.27 1 5 101 
Semi-Expert 3.40 1.16 1 5 189 
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to Others Lay-person 3.31 1.34 1 5 198 
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Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Proportion of responses to the treatment options: no treatment, psychotherapy, CBT 
with medication, CBT without medication and other, as recommended by experts, semi-experts 
and lay-people. 
 
 
None Psychotherapy 
CBT with 
Medication 
CBT without 
Medication 
Other 
N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Internal External Internal External Internal External Internal External Internal External 
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*Adjusted residuals for psychotherapy (2.7) and CBT with medication (3.6) exceed the critical 
value of 1.96. 
Expert 
3 
(7.5) 
8 
(20.0) 
14 
(35.0) 
14 
(35.0) 
7 
(17.5) 
6 
(15.0) 
15 
(37.5) 
12 
(30.0) 
1 
(2.5) 
0 
(0) 
Semi-
Expert 
13 
(14.9) 
28 
(15.2) 
18 
(20.7) 
27 
(27.3) 
17 
(19.5) 
10 
(10.1) 
38 
(43.7) 
47 
(47.5) 
1 
(1.1) 
0 
(0) 
Lay-
Person 
11 
(11.5) 
21 
(20.6) 
23* 
(24.0) 
43* 
(42.2) 
34* 
(35.4) 
14* 
(13.7) 
26 
(27.1) 
21 
(20.6) 
2 
(2.1) 
3 
(2.9) 
This is a pre-publication final draft of the paper: Murray, J., Thomson, M. E., Cooke, D. J., & 
Charles, K. E. (2011).  Influencing expert judgment: Attributions of crime causality.  Legal and 
Criminological Psychology, 16(1), 126-143. 
Influencing Expert Judgment 
Page 43 
 
 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Proportion of participants who predicted re-offending behaviour, measured across level 
of expertise and attributional manipulation. 
 
Re-Offend 
 Expert Semi-Expert Lay-Person 
N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Yes 
Internal 36 (75.0)* 60 (66.7)* 76 (80.0)* 
External 16 (34.0)* 44 (44.4)* 39 (38.6)* 
No 
Internal 12 (25.0)* 30 (33.3)* 19 (20.0)* 
External 31 (66.0)* 55 (55.6)* 62 (61.4)* 
*All adjusted residuals were found to be greater than the critical value of 1.96. 
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Figure Captions: 
 
Figure 1: Mean ratings for offender responsibility (measured on a 5-point scale) as a function of 
internal/external manipulation across crime type and level of expertise. 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean ratings for offender dangerousness to others (measured on a 5-point scale) as a 
function of internal/external manipulation across crime type and level of expertise. 
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Figure 1. 
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Figure 2. 
 
 
